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"Liking" the Social Media Revolution
Thaddeus Hoffineister*
As in other areas of society, social media has significantly influenced
the law. Currently, civil and criminal cases can, and often do, turn on an
attorney's understanding and use of social media. In the realm of family law,
most practitioners view social media as an essential tool-one that could
serve as grounds for malpractice if ignored., Even in legal academia-an
area long resistant to change-law schools are starting to understand the im-
pact of social media on the law and offer courses like Social Media and
Criminal Law and Law and Social Media.2
The goal of this essay is not to address the myriad ways social media
has influenced the legal field. It could not adequately do so, because there are
now entire books examining social media's role in such areas as criminal law
and litigation.3 Instead, this essay has a much more narrow focus; it will
examine one feature of one social media platform to illustrate how the legal
system has addressed the ever expanding role of social media within the law.
More specifically, this essay will explore Facebook's "Like" button and look
at its impact on constitutional issues 4 as well as labor, property, and eviden-
tiary laws.5
Thaddeus Hoffmeister is a professor at the University of Dayton School of
Law. He is also an author and a blog editor. See generally THADDEUS HOFFME-
ISTER, SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE COURTROOM: A NEW ERA IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(2014); see also Law and Social Media: Impact of Social Media on the Law,
WORDPRESS.COM, http://lawandsocialmedia.wordpress.com/ (last updated Nov.
26, 2014, 9:26 PM).
I. See generally Meghan Gulczynski, Don't Let Social Media Derail Your Family
Law Case, NEW JERSEY L.J., Aug. 27, 2014, available at http://www.njlaw
joumal.com/id= 12026682 82601/Dont-Let-Social-Media-Derail-Your-Family-
Law-Case.
2. Currently twenty-six law schools offer courses relating to social media and its
impact on the legal field. See Law and Social Media: Impact of Social Media
on the Law, WORDPRESS.COM, http://lawandsocialmedia.wordpress.com/law-
schools/ (last updated Nov. 26, 2014, 9:26 PM).
3. See generally HOFFMEISTER, supra note 1.
4. It should be noted that other social media platforms have similar features. For
example, Twitter has a Follow button and Google+ has +1 button.
5. See generally Third Party Buttons, ADDTHIs.COM, http://support.addthis.com/
customer/portal/articles/381237-third-party-buttons (last visited, Feb. 15,
2015).
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I. BACKGROUND
The Like button or feature first appeared on the website FriendFeed on
October 23, 2007.6 Facebook acquired FriendFeed and started using the but-
ton on February 9, 2009.7 The Like button is symbolized by a universally
recognized blue and white thumbs-up sign.8 Facebook developers define the
Like button as a tool that allows users to express their enjoyment, support, or
approval of certain content, people, activities, or ideas.9 The official
Facebook description of the button is as follows:
The Like button is the quickest way for people to share content
with their friends. A single click on the Like button will "like"
pieces of content on the web and share them on Facebook. You
can display a Share button next to the Like button to let people
add a personal message and customize who they share with.10
Similarly, courts have defined "Liking" content on social media as:
[A] way for Facebook users to share information with each other
.. Liking something on Facebook "is an easy way to let someone
know that you enjoy it.".. . Liking a Facebook Page "means you
are connecting to that Page. When you connect to a Page, it will
appear in your timeline and you will appear on the Page as a per-
son who likes that Page. The Page will also be able to post content
into your News Feed."],
If a user grows disenchanted with something he or she Likes, the user can
Unlike the page or content. The courts have noted this fact.12
Facebook's implementation of the Like button has stirred both positive
and negative interest. Generally, many businesses and individuals promote
their pages or interests in hopes of receiving a reciprocal Like. Having a
large number of Likes can be a status symbol or demonstrate popularity and
interest by others. As a result, many people and companies expend efforts
and resources in hopes of an increased number of Likes. In fact, some corn-
6. Bret Taylor, I Like It, I Like It, FRIENDBLOG (Oct. 30, 2007), http://blog.friend
feed.com/2007/1 0/i-like-it-i-like-it.html.
7. Steven Musil, Facebook Turns on Its "Like" Button, CNET (Feb 9. 2009, 9:00
PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-tums-on-its-like-button/.
8. Id.
9. Facebook Social Plugin, FACEBOOK DEVELOPERS, https://developers.facebook.
com/docs/plugins/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
10. Facebook Like Button for the Web, FACEBOOK DEVELOPERS, https://developers.
facebook.com/docs/plugins/like-button (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
11. Bland v. Roberts (Bland 1), 730 F.3d 368, 385 (4th Cir. 2013).
12. Mattocks v. Black Entm't Television L.L.C., No. 13-61582-CIV, 2014 WL
4101594, *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2014).
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panics offer users incentives, while others purchase Likes from websites such
as WeSellLikes.com.13
Facebook banned the practice of offering incentives in exchange for
Likes in 2014,14 rationalizing that this decision would "ensure quality con-
nections and help businesses reach the people who matter to them,"15 and
because they "want people to like Pages because they want to connect and
hear from the business, not because of artificial incentives."16 Facebook "be-
lieve[s] this update will benefit people and advertisers alike."17
Additional concerns surrounding the Like button arose in 2010 when a
group of plaintiffs sued Facebook claiming that children should not be al-
lowed to Like advertisements.18 In 2013, Facebook faced another lawsuit
over the Like button.19 This time, the plaintiffs asserted that Facebook con-
structed its Like button using patents issued to a Dutch programmer without
receiving permission.20
Finally, some assert that the Like button raises problems with user pri-
vacy. The argument here is that a user's Likes reveal too much personal
information to the online community.21 For example, one British study found
that a user's "race, age, IQ, sexuality, personality, substance use and political
views" could all be determined by examining the user's Likes.22
13. Martha Mendoza, How Facebook Likes Get Bought and Sold, HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 5, 2014, 9:41 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/05/
buy-facebook-likes n_4544800.html.
14. Jon Loomer, No More Facebook Like-Gating: What it Means and Why You
Should Care, JON LOOMER (Dec. 2, 2014, 3:54 PM), http://www.jonloomer.
com/2014/08/1 I/facebook-like-gating/.
15. Harshdeep Singh, Graph API v2.1 and Updated iOS and Android SDKs,
FACEBOOK DEVELOPERS BLOG (Aug. 7, 2014, 10:15 AM), https://developers.
facebook.com/blog/post/2014/08/07/Graph-API-v2. I/.
16. id.
17. Id.
18. Class Action Complaint, Cohen v. Facebook, BC444482 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct., Aug. 26, 2010).
19. Facebook Sued Over 'Like' Button, BBC NEWS (Feb. 11, 2013, 6:53 AM),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-21411622.
20. Id.
21. See Michal Kosinski et al., Private Traits and Attributes Are Predictable from
Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. U.S. AM.
5802, 5802-05 (2013), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/! 10/15/5802
.full.pdf+html.
22. Sharon Jayson, Facebook "Likes" Reveal More About You than You Think,
USA TODAY (Mar. 12, 2013, 9:01 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2013/03/11/facebook-likes-predictions-privacy/1975777/.
2014]
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While all of the aforementioned issues are important, they are beyond
the scope of this brief essay, because they relate primarily to Facebook's
internal operations. This essay will focus less on general issues surrounding
Facebook and more on the Like button's impact on specific areas of law such
as free speech, labor rights, property rights, and litigation.
II. "Lira" As FREE SPEECH
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."23
Among other things, the First Amendment protects the rights of individuals
to speak freely. The Supreme Court held that these protections apply equally
to speech occurring both offline and online.24 To date, several lower courts
have applied First Amendment safeguards to statements made on social me-
dia.25 However, prior to Bland v. Roberts, no court had examined the issue of
whether Liking something on Facebook constitutes a statement and thus im-
plicates First Amendment protections. 26 On this question, the Bland court
ultimately held that Liking content, similar to making a statement, raised
First Amendment concerns. 27
Bland involved a contested sheriff's election in Hampton, Virginia.28
The defendant was B.J. Roberts, the city sheriff of Hampton, who was run-
ning for reelection against Jim Adams.29 The plaintiffs were employees of the
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
25. See, e.g., Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:1 1CV00215 JLH, 2011 WL 5184283, at
*2-4 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 2011) (Mattingly referred directly to the firing of
various employees on her Facebook wall. "Two minutes after this post, Mat-
tingly posted another comment: 'I am trying [sic] my heart goes out to the
ladies in my office that were told by letter they were no longer needed .... It's
sad."' There, the court held that Mattingly's specific post was an expression of
constitutionally protected speech.); Gresham v. City of Atlanta, 1:10-CV-1301-
RWS-ECS, 2011 WL 4601022, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2011), report and
recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part on other grounds by No. 1:10-
CV-1301-RWS, 2011 WL 4601020 (N.D. Ga. Sep. 30, 2011) (noting that the
plaintiff posted: "Who would like to hear the story of how I arrested a forgery
perp [sic] at Best Buy online to find out later at the precinct that he was the
nephew of an Atlanta Police Investigator ... ?" The district court adopted the
Magistrate Judge's recommendation that although the statement was a close
question, it constituted enough speech to be considered speaking out as a mat-
ter of public concern.).
26. Bland 1, 730 F.3d 368, 384-85 (4th Cir. 2013).
27. Id. at 386.
28. Id. at 385-86.
29. Id. at 371-72.
[Vol. XVII
2014] "Liking" the Social Media Revolution 511
sheriffs office who supported Adams during the election.30 Upon his reelec-
tion, Roberts fired the Adams supporters in his office and they subsequently
brought suit against him in federal court.31 The plaintiffs claimed Roberts
retaliated against them for supporting his electoral opponent, which violated
their First Amendment rights.32
One of the key issues was whether Liking a Facebook page was suffi-
cient speech to merit constitutional protection.33 This issue arose because two
of the six plaintiffs demonstrated their support of Adams by Liking his cam-
paign's Facebook page. 34
In addressing the question of whether a Like constituted a statement, the
trial judge said it did not and granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.35 The trial judge took a very narrow and restrictive approach to
defining a statement on social media36 and did not view a Like as a state-
ment, in the literal sense. According to the trial judge, "[i]n cases where
courts have found constitutional speech protections extended to Facebook
posts, actual statements existed within the record."37 The trial judge then
went on to explain that when someone clicks the Like button, it is not exactly
clear why or what message he or she is trying to convey. 38 As discussed in
the Background section of this essay, people Like things for different rea-
sons. Here, the trial court said that it "will not attempt to infer the actual
content of [the deputy sheriffs] posts from one click of a button .... "39
It appears that the trial judge was not entirely clear on how the Like
button functioned, which may be one reason why the appellate court spent a
portion of its opinion explaining both Facebook and the Like button.40 Dur-
ing the subsequent appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, counsel for
the appellee attempted to bolster the lower court's decision by suggesting
that Liking something on Facebook has different connotations depending on
the person.41 Thus, one could not be sure that someone who clicked on the
30. Id. at 372-73.
31. Id.
32. Bland 1, 730 F.3d. at 372-73.
33. Id. at 386.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See Bland v. Roberts (Bland 11), 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 603 (E.D. Va. 2012).
37. Id. (emphasis in original).
38. See id. at 604.
39. Id.
40. See Bland 1, 730 F.3d at 385.
41. Oral Argument at 23:52, Bland 1, 730 F.3d 368 (No. 12-1671), available at
http://coop.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/12-1671-20130516.mp3.
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Like button was expressing an opinion.42 By way of example, counsel for the
appellee asserted that people Like things for a variety of reasons. 43 Some do
it by mistake; others do it in order to receive an award or coupon.4" The
Fourth Circuit found appellee's argument unpersuasive and overturned the
trial judge.45
Furthermore, the appellate court determined that Liking a campaign
page was not only pure speech but also symbolic expression.46 The court
stated that, "[t]he distribution of the universally understood 'thumbs up' sym-
bol in association with [the] campaign page, like the actual text that liking
the page produced, conveyed that [the plaintiffs] supported [the opposing
party's] candidacy." 47
In making its ruling in Bland, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals began
by first discussing Facebook and the Like button.48 The appellate court stated
that "[o]nce one understands the nature of what [the plaintiff] did by [L]iking
the Campaign Page, it becomes apparent that his conduct qualifies as
speech."49 Next, the court discussed what occurs when a user Likes some-
thing, stating that, "on the most basic level, clicking on the '[L]ike' button
literally causes to be published the statement that the User '[L]ikes' some-
thing, which is itself a substantive statement."50
Finally, the court moved to the main argument and drew an analogy
between online and offline conduct. Here, the court stated that "[L]iking a
political candidate's campaign page communicates the user's approval of the
candidate and supports the campaign by associating the user with it. In this
way, it is the internet equivalent of displaying a political sign in one's front
yard, which the Supreme Court has held is substantive speech."5' While other
courts had previously found that social media posts were protected speech,
the Bland decision was the first to extend that protection to the Like button.52
42. Id. at 22:11-22:15.
43. Id. at 23:52.
44. See id. 22:14, 26:05 (explaining that one can receive a coupon from Target for
using the Like button).
45. See Bland I, 730 F.3d 368 at 395.
46. Id. at 386 (noting that prior examples of symbolic speech include wearing
black armbands in Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) and burning the
American flag in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)).
47. Id.
48. See id. at 385.
49. Id. at 386.
50. Id.
51. Bland H, 730 F.3d 368 at 386.
52. Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:1 1CV00215 JLH, 2011 WL 5184283, at *4 (E.D.
Ark. Nov. 1, 2011).
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III. "LIKE" AS CONCERTED ACTIVITY
In 1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)53
to safeguard the rights of both employees and employers and to prevent cer-
tain detrimental labor practices from obstructing the free flow of com-
merce. 54 Among other things, the NLRA protects the rights of private sector
employees to engage in "concerted activity."55 Courts have interpreted "con-
certed activity" as conduct in which employees band together to address
terms and conditions of their employment.56 Examples of concerted activity
include employee discussions about wages, hours, and work conditions.57
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which prevents and reme-
dies unfair private sector labor practices, has previously determined that
statements on social media fit the definition of concerted activity.58 For ex-
ample, in Pier Sixty L.L.C., an administrative law judge found that a
Facebook posting about a supervisor constituted concerted activity-even
though it contained obscene language.59 However, it was not until the case of
Three D, L.L.C. that the NLRB was faced with the question of whether a
Like constitutes concerted activity.60 To this question, the NLRB answered in
the affirmative.
In Three D, L.L.C., Jamie LaFrance, a former employee of the Triple
Play Sports Bar and Grille, posted the following statement on Facebook:
"Maybe someone should do the owners of Triple Play a favor and buy it
from them. They can't even do the tax paperwork correctly!!! Now I OWE
money . . .Wtf!!!!! [sic]"61 Three current employees of the sports bar com-
mented on that post: (1) "I FING OWE MONEY TOO!"; (2) "1 owe too.
Such an ahole"; and (3) "I have never had to owe money at any jobs . . . i
hope i wont [sic] have to at TP ... probably will have to seeing as everyone
else does!"62 A fourth employee made no comment but Liked the initial
post.63
53. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2014).
54. Id. § 151.
55. Id. § 157.
56. See, e.g., Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S., Inc. v. NLRB, 200 F.3d 230,
238 (5th Cir. 1999).
57. See Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 753 (4th Cir. 1949); see
also Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir. 1983).
58. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (2014).
59. Pier Sixty, L.L.C, No. 2-CA-068612, 2013 WL 1702462, at *23 (N.L.R.B.
Apr. 18, 2013).
60. Three D, L.L.C., 361 N.L.R.B. 31, at *7 (2014).
61. Id. at *2.
62. Id.
63. Id.
2014]
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
A sister of one of the sports bar's owners, who was Facebook friends
with LaFrance, discovered the posts.64 She alerted her brother, who subse-
quently fired Jillian Sanzone, the employee who posted the second comment,
and Vincent Spinella, who Liked the original post.65 Prior to Spinella's termi-
nation, the sports bar's owners questioned Spinella about his use of the Like
button.66
Sanzone and Spinella subsequently brought an action against the own-
ers, alleging that they had violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA for terminat-
ing them in retaliation for protected activities.67 The owners claimed they
terminated the two employees for violating the business's internet/blogging
policy.68 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) who first heard this case de-
termined that Sanzone and Spinella's actions were protected concerted activ-
ity, and thus, could not serve as the basis for termination.69 With respect to
Spinella, the judge found that his use of the Like button was protected be-
cause it demonstrated his support for his fellow employees who were sharing
their workplace concerns. 70
In their appeal to the NLRB, the sports bar owners did not dispute that
the employees' Facebook activity was concerted activity.7' Instead, they
rested their claims on the idea that Sanzone and Spinella adopted the defama-
tory and disparaging comments of the initial post, thus losing the NLRA's
protection.72 The NLRB disagreed with those arguments and upheld the
ALJ's decision.73 However, the NLRB did overrule the AL with respect to
the sport bar's internet/blogging policy.74 Here, the NLRB found the policy
unlawful because it was too imprecise and restrictive such that "employees
would reasonably interpret it to prohibit protected activities."75
IV. "LIKE" AS PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
Due to the increased importance and value placed on Likes, it was inevi-
table that a dispute would arise over ownership. This section will briefly
discuss whether a Like can be owned and, if so, by whom: the person who
64. Id. at *3.
65. Id.
66. Three D, L.L.C., 361 N.L.R.B. 31, at *3.
67. Id. at * 11 (Statement of the Case).
68. Id. at *9.
69. Id. at *1.
70. Id. at *6.
71. Id. at *1.
72. Three D, L.L.C., 361 N.L.R.B. 31, at *1.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *8.
75. Id. at *9.
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created the Like, or the person on whose page it appears? In addressing these
questions, at least one federal judge in Florida has determined that a Like
belongs to the individual who created it, not the person who collected it.76
Mattocks v. Black Entertainment Television77 arose from a dispute be-
tween Stacey Mattocks, an insurance agent, and Black Entertainment Televi-
sion (BET) Network.78 In 2008, Mattocks developed an unofficial Facebook
Page about The Game, a television show that chronicles the lives of profes-
sional football players and their significant others.79 The series, which ini-
tially ran on the CW Network, was canceled in 2009.80 Yet, Mattocks
continued to showcase her interest in the program through her unofficial
Facebook Page dedicated to The Game.81
BET bought the rights to the series and began to re-air it in 2010.82 BET
also hired Mattocks at thirty dollars an hour to manage the Facebook page.83
In 2011, BET and Mattocks entered into a letter of agreement in which Mat-
tocks agreed to grant BET full administrative access to the Facebook Page.84
While Mattocks worked for BET, the Facebook page grew from two million
to six million Likes.85 Also, during this time, BET turned it into an official
page displaying the company's logos and trademarks,86 and allowing other
BET employees to contribute content to the page.87
76. See Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Can You Own a Facebook "Like"? Mattocks v.
BET, LAW & Soc. MEDIA: IMPACT SOC. MEDIA ON L. (Aug. 28, 2014, 9:37
PM), http://lawandsocialmedia.wordpress.com/2014/08/28/can-you-own-a-face
book-like-mattocks-v-betl.
77. Mattocks v. Black Entm't Tele., LLC, No. 13-61582-CIV, 2014 WL 4101594,
at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2014).
78. Hoffmeister, supra note 76.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. According to Facebook's Terms of Service, "[any user may create a
Page to express support for or interest in a brand, entity (place or organization),
or public figure, provided that it does not mislead others into thinking it is an
official Page, or violate someone's rights." Pages Terms, FACEBOOK, https://
www.facebook.com/legal/terms.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Hoffmeister, supra note 76.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
2014]
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Sometime in 2012, Mattocks restricted BET's access to the Facebook
page88 in order to strengthen her bargaining position during employment con-
tract negotiations with BET. Unfortunately for Mattocks, her tactics proved
unsuccessful because BET created a new Facebook Page for The Game and
asked Facebook to migrate the fans from the existing Facebook Page to the
new one.89 BET then terminated its letter of agreement with Mattocks and
Facebook shut down Mattocks's original Facebook Page.90
In 2013, Mattocks sued BET on three theories of liability-tortious in-
terference with contract, breach of contract, and conversion-none of which
were successful as the court granted BET's motion for summary judgment
and dismissed Mattocks's suit.91 Under her conversion claim, Mattocks as-
serted that BET deprived her of the substantial interest in the Facebook Page
and the significant number of Likes generated by it.92 In Florida, conversion
involves an unauthorized act that leads to the deprivation of another's prop-
erty.93 Thus, to be successful under this claim, Mattocks had to prove that
migrating the Likes was unauthorized and that she owned the Likes.
With respect to ownership, the court stated that Mattocks did not have a
proprietary interest in the Likes.94 According to the trial judge:
"[L]iking" a Facebook Page simply means that the user is expres-
sing his or her enjoyment or approval of the content. At any time,
moreover, the user is free to revoke the "[L]ike" by clicking an
"[U]nlike" button. So if anyone can be deemed to own the
"[L]ikes" on a Page, it is the individual users responsible for
them.95 Given the tenuous relationship between "[L]ikes" on a
Facebook Page and the creator of the Page, the "[L]ikes" cannot
be converted in the same manner as goodwill or other intangible
business interests.96
88. Mattocks v. Black Entm't Tele., LLC, No. 13-61582-CIV, 2014 WL 4101594,
at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2014).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at *4.
92. Id. at *8.
93. Id.
94. Mattocks, 2014 WL 4101594, at *8.
95. Id. (citing Bland I, 730 F.3d 368, 385-86 (4th Cir. 2013) for its holding that a
public employee's "[L]ike" of political-campaign page was a protected form of
free speech and expression).
96. Mattocks, 2014 WL 4101594, at *8.
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The judge also found that even if Mattocks could prove ownership of the
Likes, she could not prove that BET's migration request was unauthorized.97
This was because Mattocks breached her letter of agreement with BET.98
The Mattocks opinion probably raises more questions than it answers.
First, if Facebook users actually own Likes, then other parties should not be
allowed to exercise control over them. Under this analysis Facebook should
have denied BET's request to migrate the Likes. Instead, the individual users
should have been given the choice of whether to Like the new Facebook
Page for The Game.
Second, if Likes cannot be treated as business goodwill or intangible
business interest, a significant gap in coverage exists with respect to protect-
ing the business interests of those who use social media. Likes are valuable
and highly sought after.99 For example, the U.S. State Department between
2011 and 2013 spent approximately 630,000 dollars in advertising to increase
the number of Likes on its social media sites.00 This opinion leaves those
who spend the time, energy, and money to acquire Likes unprotected, which
will, in turn, discourage growth and development in this area.
Finally, the court missed an opportunity to clarify the growing and im-
portant area of social media asset ownership. For example, the court could
have achieved the same result through different reasoning. Here, the court
could have found that the Likes were initially owned by Mattocks but be-
came the property of BET when she started to work for the company.
V. "LIKE" AS A CRIMINAL TOOL
Generally speaking, social media crimes fall into two categories.101 Cat-
egory I crimes involve the defendant employing social media "to relay infor-
mation to victims, co-conspirators, or the general public."102 Category II
crimes "involve the defendant using social media to gather information about
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Joshua Brustein, Does a Company Own Its Facebook Likes?, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-
08-26/judge-rules-creators-of-facebook-pages-dont-own-their-likes.
100. Josh Hicks, IG Report: State Department Spent $630,000 To Increase
Facebook "Likes", WASH. POST (July 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/201 3/07/03/ig-report-state-department-spen t-630000
-to-increase-facebook-likesl.
101. THADDEUS HOFFMEISTER, SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE COURTROOM: A NEW ERA IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14 (2014).
102. Id.
2014]
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victims... *"103 With respect to Category I crimes, "the term relay applies to
any method by which an individual may deliver information to another."04
As discussed above, the Like feature is a tool for Facebook users to
express their approval to other users. Users may run afoul of the law if, for
some reason, they cannot lawfully contact or interact with the person whose
content they have Liked. For example, this will be the case when a re-
straining or protective order is in effect. Generally speaking, these orders
prohibit any contact between the parties whether it occurs online or offline.
In Tennessee, radio host Thaddeus Matthews faces criminal charges for
his improper use of the Like button.105 Police charged Matthews after he
Liked a video posted on Facebook by a former colleague.106 Unfortunately
for Matthews, the owner of the video had previously obtained a restraining
order against him.107 In this case, the victim gave the police screenshots of
her video post and Matthews's subsequent Like, which violated the order
against him and resulted in his arrest.108
VI. "LIKE" AS A PARTY ADMISSION
Court systems around the world, including the United States, have rules
governing the admissibility of evidence during trial. The purpose of these
rules is to ensure that the fact finder relies only on certain information that
the Rules deem admissible when deciding liability, guilt, or innocence. In the
federal court system, the Federal Rules of Evidence regulate the admission of
evidence. States have similar rules that govern admission of evidence in state
courts. Judges must apply these rules to the information that is submitted by
attorneys and offered by testifying witnesses to determine whether such in-
formation should be admissible.
To date, no reported cases have cited the Like button as it relates to the
Federal Rules of Evidence. However, this is not to say that the Like button
has not impacted this area of the law. For instance, one interesting develop-
ment has occurred with respect to hearsay. As some are aware, hearsay is an
out-of-court statement offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement. 0 9 Generally speaking, hearsay evidence is inadmis-
sible at trial because the Rules establish a preference that witnesses only
testify about things that they have personally observed.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Tennessee Man Arrested for Facebook Like, RT (Jan. 17, 2014, 6:47 PM),
http://rt.com/usa/man-arrested-facebook-like-790/.
106. Id.
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109. See FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
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However, there are several exemptions to the hearsay rule that allow
seemingly secondhand information to be admitted. For example, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), admissions by party opponents are ex-
cluded from the definition of hearsay. 110 Thus, if a party opponent makes an
admission, that statement can be admitted into evidence even if the party
does not testify."' This has led one legal commentator to argue that Liking
something on Facebook is a tacit admission that a user enjoys or approves of
the content." 12 Thus, arguably, a Like in and of itself could be deemed a party
admission and introduced into evidence against the user regardless of
whether the user ever testifies.113
VII. CONCLUSION
Historically, the legal system, especially the courts, has struggled at
times with understanding and applying technological innovations. For exam-
ple, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Olmstead v. United States refused to extend
Fourth Amendment protections to wiretapping.' '4 It took the Supreme Court
forty years to abandon its notion of spatial privacy and find that wiretapping
although occurring outside of the home could violate an individual's reasona-
ble expectation of privacy.
Fortunately, it appears that the legal system has absorbed the impact of
social media, at least with respect to the Like button, without too much diffi-
culty. The holding in Bland that a Like is a statement subject to constitutional
protections appears to be a natural evolution of First Amendment jurispru-
dence. In the labor law case of Three D, L.L.C., even the losing side con-
ceded that a Like was concerted activity.
With respect to criminal law, few blinked an eye when a defendant was
charged with violating a protection order for Liking someone's video. Prior
defendants have been prosecuted for sending a "poke" or "friend request" to
those who have restraining orders against them. All of these actions consti-
tute some form of prohibited social media contact. As for the rules of evi-
dence, it remains to be seen whether the court will expand party admissions
to include Likes.
Of the areas discussed in this essay, intellectual property is the one area
of law where the rules are not as clear. In addition, it appears to be the ripest
field for further discussion and future legislation. This is especially true for
determining ownership of content created on social media.
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